Return-oriented programming (ROP) has become the primary exploitation technique for
system compromise in the presence of non-executable page protections. ROP exploits are
facilitated mainly by the lack of complete address space randomization coverage or the presence
of memory disclosure vulnerabilities, necessitating additional ROP-specific mitigations.
Existing defenses against ROP exploits either require source code or symbolic debugging
information, or impose a significant runtime overhead, which limits their applicability for
the protection of third-party applications.
We propose two novel techniques to prevent ROP exploits on third-party applications
without requiring their source code or debug symbols, while at the same time incurring
a minimal performance overhead.
more here..............http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~angelos/Papers/theses/vpappas_thesis.pdf
system compromise in the presence of non-executable page protections. ROP exploits are
facilitated mainly by the lack of complete address space randomization coverage or the presence
of memory disclosure vulnerabilities, necessitating additional ROP-specific mitigations.
Existing defenses against ROP exploits either require source code or symbolic debugging
information, or impose a significant runtime overhead, which limits their applicability for
the protection of third-party applications.
We propose two novel techniques to prevent ROP exploits on third-party applications
without requiring their source code or debug symbols, while at the same time incurring
a minimal performance overhead.
more here..............http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~angelos/Papers/theses/vpappas_thesis.pdf