Abstract
Smartphones and tablets are easily lost or stolen. This makes them
susceptible to an inexpensive class of memory attacks, such as coldboot
attacks, using a bus monitor to observe the memory bus, and
DMA attacks. This paper describes Sentry, a system that allows
applications and OS components to store their code and data on
the System-on-Chip (SoC) rather than in DRAM. We use ARMspecific
mechanisms originally designed for embedded systems,
but still present in today’s mobile devices, to protect applications
and OS subsystems from memory attacks
more here..........http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/alecw/asplos-2015.pdf
Smartphones and tablets are easily lost or stolen. This makes them
susceptible to an inexpensive class of memory attacks, such as coldboot
attacks, using a bus monitor to observe the memory bus, and
DMA attacks. This paper describes Sentry, a system that allows
applications and OS components to store their code and data on
the System-on-Chip (SoC) rather than in DRAM. We use ARMspecific
mechanisms originally designed for embedded systems,
but still present in today’s mobile devices, to protect applications
and OS subsystems from memory attacks
more here..........http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/alecw/asplos-2015.pdf