Abstract
We present eclipse attacks on bitcoin’s peer-to-peer network.
Our attack allows an adversary controlling a suffi-
cient number of IP addresses to monopolize all connections
to and from a victim bitcoin node. The attacker can
then exploit the victim for attacks on bitcoin’s mining
and consensus system, including N-confirmation double
spending, selfish mining, and adversarial forks in the
blockchain. We take a detailed look at bitcoin’s peerto-peer
network, and quantify the resources involved in
our attack via probabilistic analysis, Monte Carlo simulations,
measurements and experiments with live bitcoin
nodes. Finally, we present countermeasures, inspired by
botnet architectures, that are designed to raise the bar for
eclipse attacks while preserving the openness and decentralization
of bitcoin’s current network architecture
more here.......http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/263.pdf
We present eclipse attacks on bitcoin’s peer-to-peer network.
Our attack allows an adversary controlling a suffi-
cient number of IP addresses to monopolize all connections
to and from a victim bitcoin node. The attacker can
then exploit the victim for attacks on bitcoin’s mining
and consensus system, including N-confirmation double
spending, selfish mining, and adversarial forks in the
blockchain. We take a detailed look at bitcoin’s peerto-peer
network, and quantify the resources involved in
our attack via probabilistic analysis, Monte Carlo simulations,
measurements and experiments with live bitcoin
nodes. Finally, we present countermeasures, inspired by
botnet architectures, that are designed to raise the bar for
eclipse attacks while preserving the openness and decentralization
of bitcoin’s current network architecture
more here.......http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/263.pdf