Most vulnerabilities in C are related to buffer overflows external link and string manipulation. In most cases, this would result in a segmentation fault, but specially crafted malicious input values, adapted to the architecture and environment could yield to arbitrary code execution. You will find below a list of the most common errors and suggested fixes/solutions here......https://security.web.cern.ch/security/recommendations/en/codetools/c.shtml
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Common vulnerabilities guide for C programmers
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Update: virustotal-search Version 0.1.2 Daily Quota Handling and CVEs
This new version op virustotal-search adds a bunch of options to manage the local database, and 2 features I want to highlight here......http://blog.didierstevens.com/2015/04/27/update-virustotal-search-version-0-1-2-daily-quote-handling-and-cves/
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Document: Operation Bloodninja on Cloudflare -Phishing Campaign Analysis Report
The Cyber Intelligence Operation Center (CIOC) of Tiger Security uncovered a cyber-criminal web phishing campaign targeting end users of the American Giant CloudFlare and called Operation Bloodninja. The operation, conducted by individuals of Russian language, targeted the access credentials of CloudFlare accounts, using a good degree of sophistication and several expedients to deceive potential victims Once the accounts have been compromised, criminals are potentially allowed to perform multiple tasks including the creation of fraudulent sub-domains used for additional malicious activities, launch Man in the Middle attacks (MitM), Session Hijacking, Domain Shadowing and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
more here......https://www.tigersecurity.pro/free_reports/AR_EN20150427_Operation_BloodNinja.pdf
more here......https://www.tigersecurity.pro/free_reports/AR_EN20150427_Operation_BloodNinja.pdf
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APTnotes
Various public documents, whitepapers and articles about APT campaigns from 2008-2015 here.....https://github.com/kbandla/APTnotes
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pilloc
A pin tool to visualise heap operations here.......https://github.com/sam-b/pilloc
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usbkill
usbkill waits for a change on your usb ports, then immediately kills your computer. Anti forensic, usb -> kill
Unfinished project! Expect improvements to come.
more here........https://github.com/hephaest0s/usbkill
Unfinished project! Expect improvements to come.
more here........https://github.com/hephaest0s/usbkill
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PwC DownExecute Malware: Attacks against Israeli & Palestinian interests 27 April 2015
This short report details the techniques being used in a series of attacks mostly against Israel-based organisations. The decoy documents and filenames used in the attacks suggest the intended targets include organisations with political interests or influence in Israel and Palestine. Although we are unable to link this campaign to any already documented in open source, it bears similarities to some described by others previously[1],[2].
The earliest samples in the campaign we have identified date back to the summer of 2014. The number of samples discovered and relatively small scale of infrastructure suggest the attackers have limited resources with which to conduct attacks.
more here......http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/2015/04/attacks-against-israeli-palestinian-interests.html
The earliest samples in the campaign we have identified date back to the summer of 2014. The number of samples discovered and relatively small scale of infrastructure suggest the attackers have limited resources with which to conduct attacks.
more here......http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/2015/04/attacks-against-israeli-palestinian-interests.html
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ENCRYPTING YOUR LAPTOP LIKE YOU MEAN IT
Time and again, people are told there is one obvious way to mitigate privacy threats of all sorts, from mass government surveillance to pervasive online tracking to cybercriminals: Encryption. As President Obama put it earlier this year, speaking in between his administration’s attacks on encryption, “There’s no scenario in which we don’t want really strong encryption.” Even after helping expose all the ways the government can get its hands on your data, NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden still maintained, “Encryption works. Properly implemented strong crypto systems are one of the few things that you can rely on.”
more here.......https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/04/27/encrypting-laptop-like-mean/
more here.......https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/04/27/encrypting-laptop-like-mean/
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Threatbutt Enterprise is released
Integrated into Threatbutt Suite here.......https://github.com/asshurtmacfags/threatbutt
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GPU Cracking: Rebuilding the Box
A little over two years ago, we built our first GPU cracking box. At the time, there was pretty limited information on what people were doing to build a decent cracking box, especially if you were trying to do so without breaking the bank. As with any piece of technology, things go out of date, things get upgraded, and documentation needs to get updated. Since it’s now two years since I wrote about our first system , I figured it was time to write an update to show what we’re actually using for cracking hardware now.
more here......https://blog.netspi.com/gpu-cracking-rebuilding-box/
more here......https://blog.netspi.com/gpu-cracking-rebuilding-box/
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Enterprises Hit by BARTALEX Macro Malware in Recent Spam Outbreak
Enterprises are currently being targeted by the macro malware BARTALEX in a recent outbreak of thousands of spammed emails. The infection routine for BARTALEX uses a Microsoft Word document and social engineering lure that is widely recognized by enterprises—making infection all too possible. This attack highlights how macro malware in Microsoft Office files is fast becoming a big threat to businesses and organizations.
more here.......http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/enterprises-hit-by-bartalex-macro-malware-in-recent-spam-outbreak/
more here.......http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/enterprises-hit-by-bartalex-macro-malware-in-recent-spam-outbreak/
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Malvertising Strikes on Adult Site xHamster Again
We identified a malvertising campaign taking place on adult site xHamster (Alexa rank #68, est. 514 million visitors/month according to SimilarWeb) that abused ad provider TrafficHaus and Google’s URL shortener service.
This incident reminds us of a similar one that happened at the end of January also involving the same ad network.
more here.......https://blog.malwarebytes.org/malvertising-2/2015/04/malvertising-strikes-adult-site-xhamster-again/
This incident reminds us of a similar one that happened at the end of January also involving the same ad network.
more here.......https://blog.malwarebytes.org/malvertising-2/2015/04/malvertising-strikes-adult-site-xhamster-again/
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[CORE-2015-0008] - InFocus IN3128HD Projector Multiple Vulnerabilities
1. Advisory Information
Title: InFocus IN3128HD Projector Multiple Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: CORE-2015-0008
Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/
Date published: 2015-04-27
Date of last update: 2015-04-22
Vendors contacted: InFocus
Release mode: User release
2. Vulnerability Information
Class: Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel [CWE-288], Missing Authentication for Critical Function [CWE-306]
Impact: Security bypass
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
CVE Name: CVE-2014-8383, CVE-2014-8384
3. Vulnerability Description
The InFocus [1] IN3128HD brings 1080p projection into the classroom with a bright 4000-lumen display, versatile connections and smart networking features. It's portable enough to go from room to room, yet powerful enough to be installed in a fixed position.
The InFocus IN3128HD [2] Projector is vulnerable to an authentication bypass in its web interface login page, and is missing authentication for the "webctrl.cgi.elf" CGI file, which allows several actions to be performed or configured inside the device.
4. Vulnerable Packages
InFocus IN3128HD v0.26 Firmware
Other products and versions might be affected too, but they were not tested.
5. Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds
Core Security recommends affected users avoid connecting their vulnerable devices to a remotely accessible network.
Contact the vendor for further information.
6. Credits
This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Joaquin Rodriguez Varela from Core Security CoreLabs Team. The publication of this advisory was coordinated by the Core Security Advisories Team.
7. Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code
7.1. Authentication Bypass in web server interface
The InFocus IN3128HD projector web server interface requires an admin password in order to view or modify the device configuration parameters. The vulnerability [CVE-2014-8383] is caused by a user's ability to bypass the login page (index.html) by knowing the name of the page (main.html) to which a logged user is forwarded after entering the correct password. The restricted pages contain no control whatsoever of logged or unauthenticated users. The login only checks the entered password and does not generate a session cookie if the user logs in correctly. The following URL allows an alternate preauth path to the restricted section:
http://<Projector-web-
This allows an unauthenticated user to access the device as an administrator and to see private information such as network configuration (network mask, DNS server, gateway, etc), WiFi configuration (including password), and the ability to modify any of these parameters.
7.2. Missing Authentication for Critical CGI file
The vulnerability [CVE-2014-8384] is caused by a missing authentication mechanism for the "webctrl.cgi.elf" CGI file, which is used by the web server to apply configuration changes. This file is located inside the "cgi-bin" folder, and is accessible by any unauthenticated user, allowing it to perform several configuration modifications and actions inside the projector.
Here are some examples of what can be done remotely and without authentication if the following URLs are used:
Modify any parameter in the DHCP Server configuration:
http://<Projector-web-
Modify any parameter in the device IP configuration (DNS server as well):
http://<Projector-web-
Remotely reboot the device (not only the web server):
http://<Projector-web-
Change the device hostname:
http://<Projector-web-
Several other actions and configurations can be performed using this CGI file, but is trivial to detail all of them considering that are the same actions a user can perform from the web interface.
8. Report Timeline
2015-04-07: Core Security sent an initial notification to InFocus.
2015-04-13: Core Security sent another notification to InFocus using their online contact support form [3].
2015-04-14: Core Security tried to contact InFocus employees using LinkedIn without success.
2015-04-16: Core Security contacted InFocus using Twitter and requested an email address that could be used to contact them.
2015-04-16: InFocus replied using their official Twitter account indicating that product support questions should be directed to the form at infocus.com/support/ orsupport@infocus.com.
2015-04-16: Core Security sent another email to the provided email requesting an answer.
2015-04-20: Core Security sent another email to the provided email account stating that an answer had not yet been received, and if that was still true on Friday, April 24, Core Security would be forced to publish its findings on Monday, April 27.
2015-04-21: Core Security contacted InFocus again using Twitter and explained that multiple attempts to contact them had been performed without any luck and requested a response.
2015-04-21: InFocus replied using their official Twitter account asking us to provide an email account so a support representative could contact us.
2015-04-21: Core Security provided the official advisories email in order to be contacted by an InFocus representative.
2015-04-22: InFocus sent an email stating that they were requested by their public relations department to contact Core Security. They asked Core to send them the draft version of the advisory.
2015-04-22: Core Security explained that it is not recommended to send this kind of information in plain text and asked if they could use PGP to send encrypted emails. In case they didn't want to use encrypted communications, Core was willing to send the draft advisory in plain text.
2015-04-22: InFocus informed Core Security that they no longer had any desire to see the information (advisory) and told Core to publish it if we felt it necessary.
2015-04-22: Core Security replied to InFocus that Core regretted their decision and that Core's only objective is to make users safer. We informed them that we will now have to make a user-release of the advisory without giving their affected users an alternative to solve the issues.
2015-04-27: Advisory CORE-2015-0008 published.
9. References
[1] http://www.infocus.com.
[2] http://www.infocus.com/
[3] http://www.infocus.com/
10. About CoreLabs
CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software tools for public use at: http://corelabs.coresecurity.
11. About Core Security Technologies
Core Security Technologies enables organizations to get ahead of threats with security test and measurement solutions that continuously identify and demonstrate real-world exposures to their most critical assets. Our customers can gain real visibility into their security standing, real validation of their security controls, and real metrics to more effectively secure their organizations.
Core Security's software solutions build on over a decade of trusted research and leading-edge threat expertise from the company's Security Consulting Services, CoreLabs and Engineering groups. Core Security Technologies can be reached at +1 (617) 399-6980 or on the Web at: http://www.coresecurity.com.
12. Disclaimer
The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2015 Core Security and (c) 2015 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/
13. PGP/GPG Keys
This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security advisories team, which is available for download at http://www.coresecurity.com/
Title: InFocus IN3128HD Projector Multiple Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: CORE-2015-0008
Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/
Date published: 2015-04-27
Date of last update: 2015-04-22
Vendors contacted: InFocus
Release mode: User release
2. Vulnerability Information
Class: Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel [CWE-288], Missing Authentication for Critical Function [CWE-306]
Impact: Security bypass
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
CVE Name: CVE-2014-8383, CVE-2014-8384
3. Vulnerability Description
The InFocus [1] IN3128HD brings 1080p projection into the classroom with a bright 4000-lumen display, versatile connections and smart networking features. It's portable enough to go from room to room, yet powerful enough to be installed in a fixed position.
The InFocus IN3128HD [2] Projector is vulnerable to an authentication bypass in its web interface login page, and is missing authentication for the "webctrl.cgi.elf" CGI file, which allows several actions to be performed or configured inside the device.
4. Vulnerable Packages
InFocus IN3128HD v0.26 Firmware
Other products and versions might be affected too, but they were not tested.
5. Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds
Core Security recommends affected users avoid connecting their vulnerable devices to a remotely accessible network.
Contact the vendor for further information.
6. Credits
This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Joaquin Rodriguez Varela from Core Security CoreLabs Team. The publication of this advisory was coordinated by the Core Security Advisories Team.
7. Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code
7.1. Authentication Bypass in web server interface
The InFocus IN3128HD projector web server interface requires an admin password in order to view or modify the device configuration parameters. The vulnerability [CVE-2014-8383] is caused by a user's ability to bypass the login page (index.html) by knowing the name of the page (main.html) to which a logged user is forwarded after entering the correct password. The restricted pages contain no control whatsoever of logged or unauthenticated users. The login only checks the entered password and does not generate a session cookie if the user logs in correctly. The following URL allows an alternate preauth path to the restricted section:
http://<Projector-web-
This allows an unauthenticated user to access the device as an administrator and to see private information such as network configuration (network mask, DNS server, gateway, etc), WiFi configuration (including password), and the ability to modify any of these parameters.
7.2. Missing Authentication for Critical CGI file
The vulnerability [CVE-2014-8384] is caused by a missing authentication mechanism for the "webctrl.cgi.elf" CGI file, which is used by the web server to apply configuration changes. This file is located inside the "cgi-bin" folder, and is accessible by any unauthenticated user, allowing it to perform several configuration modifications and actions inside the projector.
Here are some examples of what can be done remotely and without authentication if the following URLs are used:
Modify any parameter in the DHCP Server configuration:
http://<Projector-web-
Modify any parameter in the device IP configuration (DNS server as well):
http://<Projector-web-
Remotely reboot the device (not only the web server):
http://<Projector-web-
Change the device hostname:
http://<Projector-web-
Several other actions and configurations can be performed using this CGI file, but is trivial to detail all of them considering that are the same actions a user can perform from the web interface.
8. Report Timeline
2015-04-07: Core Security sent an initial notification to InFocus.
2015-04-13: Core Security sent another notification to InFocus using their online contact support form [3].
2015-04-14: Core Security tried to contact InFocus employees using LinkedIn without success.
2015-04-16: Core Security contacted InFocus using Twitter and requested an email address that could be used to contact them.
2015-04-16: InFocus replied using their official Twitter account indicating that product support questions should be directed to the form at infocus.com/support/ orsupport@infocus.com.
2015-04-16: Core Security sent another email to the provided email requesting an answer.
2015-04-20: Core Security sent another email to the provided email account stating that an answer had not yet been received, and if that was still true on Friday, April 24, Core Security would be forced to publish its findings on Monday, April 27.
2015-04-21: Core Security contacted InFocus again using Twitter and explained that multiple attempts to contact them had been performed without any luck and requested a response.
2015-04-21: InFocus replied using their official Twitter account asking us to provide an email account so a support representative could contact us.
2015-04-21: Core Security provided the official advisories email in order to be contacted by an InFocus representative.
2015-04-22: InFocus sent an email stating that they were requested by their public relations department to contact Core Security. They asked Core to send them the draft version of the advisory.
2015-04-22: Core Security explained that it is not recommended to send this kind of information in plain text and asked if they could use PGP to send encrypted emails. In case they didn't want to use encrypted communications, Core was willing to send the draft advisory in plain text.
2015-04-22: InFocus informed Core Security that they no longer had any desire to see the information (advisory) and told Core to publish it if we felt it necessary.
2015-04-22: Core Security replied to InFocus that Core regretted their decision and that Core's only objective is to make users safer. We informed them that we will now have to make a user-release of the advisory without giving their affected users an alternative to solve the issues.
2015-04-27: Advisory CORE-2015-0008 published.
9. References
[1] http://www.infocus.com.
[2] http://www.infocus.com/
[3] http://www.infocus.com/
10. About CoreLabs
CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software tools for public use at: http://corelabs.coresecurity.
11. About Core Security Technologies
Core Security Technologies enables organizations to get ahead of threats with security test and measurement solutions that continuously identify and demonstrate real-world exposures to their most critical assets. Our customers can gain real visibility into their security standing, real validation of their security controls, and real metrics to more effectively secure their organizations.
Core Security's software solutions build on over a decade of trusted research and leading-edge threat expertise from the company's Security Consulting Services, CoreLabs and Engineering groups. Core Security Technologies can be reached at +1 (617) 399-6980 or on the Web at: http://www.coresecurity.com.
12. Disclaimer
The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2015 Core Security and (c) 2015 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/
13. PGP/GPG Keys
This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security advisories team, which is available for download at http://www.coresecurity.com/
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Threat Spotlight: TeslaCrypt – Decrypt It Yourself
After the takedown of Cryptolocker, we have seen the rise of Cryptowall. Cryptowall 2 introduced “features” such as advanced anti-debugging techniques, only to have many of those features removed in Cryptowall 3. Ransomware is becoming an extremely lucrative business, leading to many variants and campaigns targeting even localized regions in their own specific languages. Although it is possible that these multiple variants are sponsored by the same threat actor, the most likely conclusion is that multiple threat actors are jumping in to claim a portion of an ever increasing ransomware market. One of the latest variants is called TeslaCrypt and appears to be a derivative of the original Cryptolocker ransomware. Although it claims to be using asymmetric RSA-2048 to encrypt files, it is making use of symmetric AES instead. Talos was able to develop a tool which decrypts the files encrypted by the TeslaCrypt ransomware.
more here.......http://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/teslacrypt
more here.......http://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/teslacrypt
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Paper: Automatic Generation of Assembly to IR Translators Using Compilers
Abstract—Translating low-level machine instructions into
higher-level intermediate representation (IR) is one of the central
steps in many binary translation, analysis and instrumentation
systems. Most of these systems manually build the machine
instruction to IR mapping table needed for such a translation.
As a result, these systems often suffer from two problems:
(a) a great deal of manual effort is required to support new
architectures, and (b) even for existing architectures, lack of
support for recent instruction set extensions, e.g., Valgrind’s lack
of support for AVX, FMA4 and SSE4.1 for x86 processors. To
overcome these difficulties, we propose a novel approach based
on learning the assembly-to-IR mapping automatically. Modern
compilers such as GCC and LLVM embed knowledge about
these mappings in their code generators. By leveraging this
knowledge, our approach can greatly reduce the implementation
effort required for lifting binary code to IR. Moreover, such an
approach is architecture-neutral, being able to support numerous
architectures for which GCC (or other compilers) already have
a backend. While coverage can be a challenge in learning-based
approaches, note that in this problem domain, there is virtually an
endless supply of training data that can be obtained by translating
vast quantities of open-source code using compilers such as GCC
and LLVM. We present experimental results that demonstrate
the promise of our approach. Already, our implementation can
support multiple architectures (x86, ARM and AVR), handle
binaries of significant size (openssl and binutils), and be
applied to multiple compilers (GCC and LLVM).
more here..........http://seclab.cs.sunysb.edu/seclab/pubs/amasbt15.pdf
higher-level intermediate representation (IR) is one of the central
steps in many binary translation, analysis and instrumentation
systems. Most of these systems manually build the machine
instruction to IR mapping table needed for such a translation.
As a result, these systems often suffer from two problems:
(a) a great deal of manual effort is required to support new
architectures, and (b) even for existing architectures, lack of
support for recent instruction set extensions, e.g., Valgrind’s lack
of support for AVX, FMA4 and SSE4.1 for x86 processors. To
overcome these difficulties, we propose a novel approach based
on learning the assembly-to-IR mapping automatically. Modern
compilers such as GCC and LLVM embed knowledge about
these mappings in their code generators. By leveraging this
knowledge, our approach can greatly reduce the implementation
effort required for lifting binary code to IR. Moreover, such an
approach is architecture-neutral, being able to support numerous
architectures for which GCC (or other compilers) already have
a backend. While coverage can be a challenge in learning-based
approaches, note that in this problem domain, there is virtually an
endless supply of training data that can be obtained by translating
vast quantities of open-source code using compilers such as GCC
and LLVM. We present experimental results that demonstrate
the promise of our approach. Already, our implementation can
support multiple architectures (x86, ARM and AVR), handle
binaries of significant size (openssl and binutils), and be
applied to multiple compilers (GCC and LLVM).
more here..........http://seclab.cs.sunysb.edu/seclab/pubs/amasbt15.pdf
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When Prevention Fails, Incident Response Begins
I’ve been asked a few times this year ($dayjob) to discuss and review incident handling practices with some of our clients. This topic seems to have come up to the surface again, and with some breaches getting main-stream coverage, it only makes sense. Taking a look at some of our past posts here...........https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/When+Prevention+Fails+Incident+Response+Begins/19629/
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libshe- Symmetric homomorphic encryption library
Homomorphic encryption is a kind of encryption that allows to execute functions over the ciphertexts without decrypting them. This library implements a symmetric variant of originally asymmetric homomorphic encryption scheme over the integers by van Dijk et al. (DGHV10) using ciphertext compression techniques from (CNT11). The symmetricity of the scheme means that only the private key is used to encrypt and decrypt ciphertexts. A relatively small public element, however, is used in homomorphic operations, but it is not a real public key.
more here.........https://github.com/bogdan-kulynych/libshe
more here.........https://github.com/bogdan-kulynych/libshe
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Popular Android Apps with SSL Certificate Validation Failure
PicsArt (100 Million Downloads), ASTRO File Manager with Cloud (50 Million Downloads),
ES File Explorer File Manager (100 Million Downloads), CityShop - for Craigslist (10 Million Downloads), Truecaller - Caller ID & Block (50 Million Downloads), Plaintext PII Transmission
Instachat (5 Million Downloads) and more here.........https://samsclass.info/128/proj/popular-ssl.htm
ES File Explorer File Manager (100 Million Downloads), CityShop - for Craigslist (10 Million Downloads), Truecaller - Caller ID & Block (50 Million Downloads), Plaintext PII Transmission
Instachat (5 Million Downloads) and more here.........https://samsclass.info/128/proj/popular-ssl.htm
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WordPress 4.2 stored XSS Quick'n'Dirty Fix
--- wordpress/wp-comments-post.php2015-01-08 08:05:25.000000000 +0100
+++ htdocs/wp-comments-post.php2015-04-27 16:50:24.250000000 +0200
@@ -12,6 +12,12 @@
exit;
}
+$psize=0;
+foreach($_POST as $p) {
+$psize += strlen($p);
+}
+if ($psize > 50000) die("Comment too large");
+
/** Sets up the WordPress Environment. */
require( dirname(__FILE__) . '/wp-load.php' );
https://files.hboeck.de/wordpress-4.2-emergency-fix-xss.diff
Authored by Hanno Bock who created this bandaid for now because there is currently no upstream fix
+++ htdocs/wp-comments-post.php2015-04-27 16:50:24.250000000 +0200
@@ -12,6 +12,12 @@
exit;
}
+$psize=0;
+foreach($_POST as $p) {
+$psize += strlen($p);
+}
+if ($psize > 50000) die("Comment too large");
+
/** Sets up the WordPress Environment. */
require( dirname(__FILE__) . '/wp-load.php' );
https://files.hboeck.de/wordpress-4.2-emergency-fix-xss.diff
Authored by Hanno Bock who created this bandaid for now because there is currently no upstream fix
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Hacker Implants NFC Chip In His Hand To Bypass Security Scans And Exploit Android Phones
Going by hacker stereotypes, it’d be pretty easy to physically identify anyone committing an act of digital crime. A combination of pallid skin, hoody and laptop is the biggest giveaway. Such hackneyed images of hackers are, of course, evidently wrong, bordering on offensive. Real hackers penetrating business networks have the common sense to avoid cliched clothing and try to conceal their tools.
For those who can bear the pain, biohacking, where computing devices are injected under the skin, provides a novel way to acquire real stealth to sneak through both physical and digital scans.
more here........http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2015/04/27/implant-android-attack/
For those who can bear the pain, biohacking, where computing devices are injected under the skin, provides a novel way to acquire real stealth to sneak through both physical and digital scans.
more here........http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2015/04/27/implant-android-attack/
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