We present a new attack framework for conducting cach-
based side-channel attacks and demonstrate this framework
in attacks between tenants on commercial Platform-as-a-
Service (PaaS) clouds. Our framework uses the Flush-
Reload attack of Gullasch et al. as a primitive, and ex-
tends this work by leveraging it within an automaton-driven
strategy for tracing a victim’s execution. We leverage our
framework first to confirm co-location of tenants and then
to extract secrets across tenant boundaries. We specifically
demonstrate attacks to collect potentially sensitive applica-
tion data (e.g., the number of items in a shopping cart), to
hijack user accounts, and to break SAML single sign-on. To
the best of our knowledge, our attacks are the first granular,
cross-tenant, side-channel attacks successfully demonstrated
on state-of-the-art commercial clouds, PaaS or otherwise
more here...........http://www.cs.unc.edu/~reiter/papers/2014/CCS1.pdf